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Abstract: For Hegel, nature embodies the necessary structures described in his Logic, but 
spread out in space, the realm of externality. Human culture, on the other hand, develops by a 
complex process of internalizing its history through time. But this way of reading a Matter/Spirit 
dichotomy is too straightforward. For nature includes its own modes of internalization and its 
own kind of external recapitulation. Hegel knew that the face of the earth had been shaped by 
long-term geological processes that can be read in the current formations. If rocks and hills have 
a temporal dimension, what about current natural kinds and the fossils found in those rocks? 
Though Hegel rejected the theories of evolution current in his day, he had room for a historical 
unfolding of the Idea of Nature.  
 
Introduction 
Hegel, so the story goes, was a philosopher of spirit, an idealist, interested in logic and society. 
So why should we pay much attention to what he might say about nature and natural history? We 
are told he said that nature has no history. 
In Hegel's published works long volumes of lectures are devoted to history, religion, spirit, and 
logic. Nature is treated more briefly in the second part of his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical 
Sciences. This text is dense, abbreviated. There are added notes taken from student records of 
Hegel's lectures, but these are not well linked with one another. The people who prepared Hegel's 
lectures for publication after his death apparently didn't feel the lectures on nature needed to be 
assembled together, whereas they synthesized (not always well) many years’ lectures on history, 
art, and religion. 
So why even ask about natural history in Hegel? There are several reasons. First, he does suggest 
novel ways to think about nature. Hegel was closely associated with Schelling and other figures 
in German Romanticism who had creative theories of nature, and while Hegel came to reject 
their overall views, he was marked by the encounter. Second, Hegel was interested in the science 
of his day and relatively well read on its developments and controversies. From our perspective, 
he took the wrong side on some of those controversies, but his comments on them remain 
interesting and often insightful. 
It remains true nonetheless that Hegel's is preeminently a philosophy of spirit, self-consciousness 
and culture. Not for him the romantic exultation of nature in itself, and not for him Schelling's 
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attempt to use categories derived from nature to understand spirit and history. For Hegel the 
dependence goes the other way, for nature shows us structures and processes that echo in 
primitive form the more developed processes revealed in culture and history.  
Studying Nature 
To find out about Hegel's conceptual analysis of the natural world, we look to his Encyclopedia 
and his Science of Logic. To find out what it means to live in nature and to be confronted by its 
energy and diversity, we look to his texts on art and religion. Hegel's rhetoric about the way 
nature enters our lives seldom sounds like a romantic exaltation of nature, and he does not 
believe in an unreflective life in unity with nature. Our goal not an immediate but a resultant 
connection.  
A natural unity of thought and intuition is that of the child and the animal, and this can at the 
most be called feeling, not spirituality. But man must have eaten of the tree of the knowledge 
of good and evil and must have gone through the labour and activity of thought in order to 
become what he is, having [opened up and then] overcome this separation between himself 
and nature. (EN par. 246z)1 
We need to distance ourselves from any immediate feeling of unity and mythological 
identification with nature, then reintegrate ourselves with nature by studying it and finding there 
the lineaments of spirit. 
Hegel wants us to conduct a double study.2 First we derive by a self-investigation of pure 
thought the logical categories required for thinking about any being on any level. These are valid 
in both nature and culture. They provide the framework Hegel is willing to call "metaphysical." 
For metaphysics is nothing else but the entire range of the universal determinations of 
thought, as it were the diamond net into which everything is brought and thereby first made 
intelligible. Every educated consciousness has its metaphysics, an instinctive way of thinking, 
the absolute power within us of which we become master only when we make it in turn the 
object of our knowledge. Philosophy in general has, as philosophy, other categories than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  References to Hegel’s philosophy of nature in the second part of his Encyclopedia of the 
Philosophical Sciences are here abbreviated EN, followed by the paragraph number, followed by 
"z" if the extract is material added from Hegel's lectures. I have occasionally modified the 
translations.	  2	  For discussions of Hegel’s methodology, see the essays collected in Stephen Houlgate, ed., 
Hegel and the Philosophy of Nature, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1998, as well as Houlgate’s own 
discussion of the philosophy of nature, in his An Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth and 
History, Oxford: Blackwell, 2005. 	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those of the ordinary consciousness: all education (Bildung) reduces to the distinction of 
categories. All revolutions, in the sciences no less than in world history, originate solely from 
the fact that spirit, in order to understand and comprehend itself with a view to possessing 
itself, has changed its categories, comprehending itself more truly, more deeply, more 
intimately, and more in unity with itself. (EN par. 246z) 
Hegel calls the result of the logical investigation "the absolute Idea," which is the involuted final 
category that includes all the others as its moments and aspects of its self-referential unity. The 
content of the absolute Idea is its own self-development. The final section of the logic reflects 
back on the earlier sections and discerns the dialectical motions of its subsidiary concepts, 
especially the move from concepts describing simple immediate presence, to kinds of mediated 
unities, to self-differentiating unities that hold together unity and diversity.  
The key to understanding nature, for Hegel, is a prior understanding of the internal distinctions 
and divisions within this complex conceptual unity. Often he refers to it as das Begriff, which is 
etymologically "what grasps together," and is the standard German word for "concept." This is 
translated as "Concept" (sometimes, confusingly, as "Notion"), but it not a single concept such as 
"cow" or "cause" but more like a whole set of categories with their complex internal connections 
mutually constituting one another and describing their own logical connections and 
transformations.  
Having derived categories that describe the way different kinds of being and unity come 
together, we then study how nature, as revealed by contemporary science, embodies the various 
moments of this complex movement. Logic comes first; we do not derive our basic categories 
from the always incomplete empirical sciences. 
One must start from the Concept; and even if, perhaps, the Concept cannot yet give an 
adequate account of the "abundant variety" of Nature so-called, we must nevertheless have 
faith in the Concept though many details are as yet unexplained. The demand that everything 
be explained is altogether vague; that it has not been fulfilled is no reflection on the Concept, 
whereas in the case of the theories of the empirical physicists the position is quite the reverse: 
these must explain everything, for their validity rests only on particular cases. The Concept, 
however, is valid in its own right; the particulars then will soon find their explanation. (EN 
par 353z)3 
We can trace how nature approaches more closely to spirit's unity-in-difference as we study more 
and more complex natural systems and organisms. Hegel works with a priori definitions of what 
it means to be a mechanism, a chemical unity, an organism. He leaves to empirical contingencies 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3
 In Kolb 2008 I discuss the ways in which the relation of the logical categories to nature has 
been wrongly interpreted as the operation of a separate level of causality, when instead their 
power is in defining the dispositions and potentialities of things.	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just what develops to fulfill these definitions. He distinguishes the general categorial structure 
from the contingent detail of nature. The logic shows the general types that must be thought, but 
no natural being appears as only a general type. What philosophy provides is the general scheme, 
so we know, for example, that an animal organism must have subsystems for mobility, 
perception, for gathering energy from its environment. But whether it has two legs or eight, one 
eye or a hundred, and what precise species of bird it is, these are contingent details. Also, how 
the organism came to have its particular features is an empirical question that is not of 
philosophical interest to Hegel. Overall his investigation is more like devising a periodic table of 
the elements than an evolutionary tree. When he said that nature has no history he did not mean 
that individual species were eternal; he meant that the logical categories for nature’s general 
types were derived and valid in pure thought without reference to empirical history. 
Put very abstractly, for Hegel spirit aims at becoming fully self-present to and in its own 
complex unity and development. That development requires that each of the basic moments and 
aspects studied by the logic be brought forth explicitly, be posited more or less independently on 
its own, and then be brought back into a larger overarching unity. Spirit develops by having all 
its logically necessary moments and movements posited "outside" and then brought "inside" its 
self-awareness.  
In this development, everything is interdependent, despite initial appearances of separation. 
Nothing stands purely on its own; everything is mediated through relations and processes with 
other aspects, moments, and things that in their turn are mediated. Their interrelation may be 
simplified and mechanical, but there is always interrelation. There are no simple units that can be 
fully just what they are without any connection to anything else. There is no level of 
fundamental, totally independent atomic entities in nature (nor in psychology, thought, or 
society).4  
Nature's levels of increasingly complex empirical interrelations might be seen as developing over 
time. Hegel had little interest in whether or not they did. Nature's fertility works both in the past 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4
 Hegel was in every area opposed to theories that postulated a basic layer of isolated 
independent entities (material atoms, isolated sense data, pre-social rational individuals, self-
contained concepts) with no necessary connections to one another and to larger unities. What is 
fundamental for Hegel is the logical structure of the processes of mediation and interaction. This 
led him to deny the atomic theory of chemistry as it was proposed at his time. He was mistaken, 
but his emphasis was correct. For even at that time the atomic theory was no longer a theory of 
fundamentally self-sufficient independent entities. Hegel pointed out how Newton's theory of 
gravity compromised the strict independence of the atoms, and he saw that new observations of 
chemical and electric forces were also undermining strict atomism. He might feel vindicated 
today since our atoms are even less independent and self-sufficient; their particles are also waves 
and transform themselves into one another, while quantum nonlocal effects and decoherence 
indicate further entanglements that we do not yet fully understand. 	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and present; what was important for philosophy was not tracing the details of what developed 
from what, but showing how the different logical moments of spirit's processes were embodied 
externally in nature's immense variety. 
Hegel was well aware of the bountiful variety of nature. He followed Aristotle in distinguishing 
the three broad categories of mineral, vegetable, and animal. However he was also aware that the 
world revealed by the microscope showed vast new ranges of living things, among which Hegel 
seemed most interested in plankton and other tiny creatures that show the ocean to be a natural 
womb from which life constantly emerges. "The fecundity of the Earth causes life to break forth 
everywhere and in every way" (EN par. 370z).  
Hegel also read reports about types of animals that differed from those alive today. He 
interpreted the fossil record as showing extinct species and experimental forms intermediate 
between the usual types. He claims these, along with present-day intermediate forms such as the 
platypus, reveal both nature's fertility and its inability to embody precise categorical distinctions.  
Almost less even than the other spheres of nature, can the animal world exhibit within itself 
an independent, rational system of organization, or hold fast to the forms prescribed by the 
Concept, preserving them, in face of the imperfection and medley of conditions, from 
confusion, degeneration, and transitional forms. (EN par 370z) 
The variety of nature exceeds the set of categories that Hegel argued are the a priori structure of 
nature. But far from this undermining the categories, it shows that in its externality nature is not 
able to embody the full complexities of the logical concept.  
Outsides 
Nature is the primal and ultimate "outside." The different levels and types within nature exist 
spread out in space, externally connected to one another. Individual natural things in their turn 
show sets of properties that may have no necessary connections.  
The contradiction of the Idea, arising from the fact that, as nature, it is external to itself, is 
more precisely this: that on the one hand there is the necessity of its forms which is generated 
by the Concept and their rational determination in the organic totality; while on the other 
hand, there is their indifferent contingency and indeterminable irregularity. In the sphere of 
nature contingency and determination from without has its right. This contingency is at its 
greatest in the realm of concrete individual forms, which however, as products of nature, are 
concrete only in an immediate manner. The immediately concrete thing is a group of 
properties, external to one another and more or less indifferently related to each other. For 
that very reason, the simple subjectivity which exists for itself is also indifferent and 
abandons them to contingent and external determination. This is the impotence of nature, that 
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it preserves the determinations of the Concept only abstractly, and leaves their detailed 
specification to external determination. (EN 250) 
However, this externality is not the whole story. Hegel's picture of nature is a complex balance 
between individuals that show forth the different aspects of spirit and interactions that link them 
into natural wholes. Nature's variety is not a pile of completely separate items. Gravity unites 
separated bodies into physical systems. Chemistry and electricity show how seemingly 
independent beings intimately influence one another. Different organisms form complex 
networks as they share space, rely on and prey upon one another. Yet these kinds of 
dependencies remain external and do not form a tight unity such as is found inside a single 
organism or in the history of self-aware individuals and cultures.5  
At every level of nature the entire Concept is present, but not in its fully explicit and mediated 
unity. For instance, in the abstract consideration of matter we see both the self-division of the 
Concept, in the separate points of space, and its unity, in the gravity that holds space and its 
contents together. 
To show the different levels of unity in nature, Hegel several times compares the solar system 
with an animal organism. In the solar system different aspects of the Concept are embodied in 
the different motions of the planets, moons, and comets, which exist as independent bodies 
externally related to one another. The unity of the system is expressed abstractly as the 
gravitational force that holds them together, and concretely in the existence of the sun as the 
center of the system.  
The Sun, comets, moons, and planets appear, on the one hand, as heavenly bodies 
independent and different from one another; but, on the other hand, they are what they are 
only because of the determined place they occupy in the total system of bodies. Their specific 
kind of movement as well as their physical properties can be derived only from their situation 
in the system. This interconnection constitutes them in the unity that relates their particular 
existence to one another and holds them together. Yet the Concept cannot stop at this purely 
implicit unity of the independently existing particular bodies. For it has to make real not only 
its distinctions but also its self-relating unity. This unity now distinguishes itself from the 
mutual externality of the objective particular bodies and acquires for itself at this stage, in 
contrast to this mutual externality, a real, bodily, independent existence. For example, in the 
solar system the sun exists as this unity of the system, over against the real differences within 
it. But the existence of the ideal unity in this way is itself still of a defective kind, for, on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5
 Hegel does not follow the Stoics for whom nature as a whole is a single living organism, in 
which each thing keeps to its appointed role. Nature's externality means that there will be many 
different unities and kinds of unity, all expressing the Concept, but unable to come together into 
a whole in the way spirit can unify and totalize itself in politics and community, and more 
completely in art, religion, and philosophy.	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one hand, it becomes real only as the relation together of the particular independent bodies 
and their bearing on one another, and, on the other hand, as one body in the system. (Hegel’s 
Aesthetics, vol. I, 117-18) 
Externality, unity, and interdependence can all be found in the solar system, just as in animal 
organisms. But in organisms the individual moments of the Concept are expressed in subsystems 
and organs that are more deeply interdependent and cannot exist independently on their own as 
do the planets.  
The sun, planets, comets, the elements, plants, animals, exist separately by themselves. The 
sun is an individual other than the earth, connected with the planets only by gravity. It is only 
in life that we meet with subjectivity and the counter to externality. The heart, liver, eye are 
not self-subsistent individualities on their own account, and the hand, when separated from 
the body, putrefies. The organic body is still a whole composed of many members external to 
each other; but each individual member exists only in the subject, and the Concept exists as 
the power over these members. (EN par. 248z) 
In organisms, there is no separate organ expressing unity, as does the sun in the solar system. 
The unifying principle of the organism is present in every piece but not itself identified with any 
one of them. The organism is thus a more complex expression of the logical process of unity in 
diversity. Yet the animal organism is not yet fully unified, for while animals have a sense of 
themselves as individuals, they have no conceptual self-knowledge.  
What this comparison shows is how Hegel is constantly looking for how the variety of nature 
expresses logically defined moments of the Concept, as the externality of nature is overcome by 
more and more organic modes of unity. His understanding is top-down, for the principles of 
unity are fully expressed only in the most developed levels, whose development consists in 
expressing all the moments and their interrelations in their full concrete complexity. 
In order to understand the lower grades, one must note the developed organism, since it is the 
standard or archetype for the less developed animal; for in the developed animal, every 
function has attained to a developed existence, and it is therefore clear that it is only from this 
animal that undeveloped organisms can be understood. (EN par. 370z) 
To our eyes Hegel's treatment of the variety of nature is a strange mixture of the a priori and the 
empirical. He is eager to read the latest discoveries about ocean creatures or geological features 
or chemical phenomena, yet on the other hand he does not attempt to derive his categories for 
nature from these phenomena, but rather to bring the categories already established in the logic 
to the phenomena. There may, of course, be a mutual cross-fertilization going on as he revises 
the logic, but the official method of the system is that a set of categories derived on their own is 
to be the lens through which we see and organize nature's incredible variety.  
Outside and In, David Kolb 
	   7	  
The infinity of forms of animal life is not to be rigidly conceived as if they conformed 
absolutely to a necessary principle of classification. On the contrary, therefore, it is the 
general determinations that must be made the rule, and natural forms compared with it. If 
they do not tally with it but exhibit certain correspondences, if they agree with it in one 
respect but not in another, then it is not the rule, the characteristic of the genus or class, which 
is to be altered, as if this has to conform to these existences, but conversely it is the latter 
which ought to conform to the rule; and insofar as this actual existence does not do so, the 
defect belongs to it. (EN par. 370z)6 
Externality is nature's defining characteristic but also its weakness. Nature's unities are not 
inward enough to contain the full movements described in the Concept. Nor can nature keep to 
the strict divisions conceived in the logic. 
In the impotence of nature to adhere strictly to the Concept in its realization, lies the 
difficulty and, in many cases, the impossibility of finding fixed distinctions for classes and 
orders by an empirical consideration of nature. Nature everywhere blurs the essential limits 
of species and genera by intermediate and defective forms, which continually furnish counter 
examples to every fixed distinction; this even occurs within a specific genus, that of man, for 
example, where monstrous births, on the one hand, must be considered as belonging to the 
genus, while on the other hand, they lack certain essential determinations characteristic of the 
genus. In order to be able to consider such forms as defective, imperfect and deformed, one 
must presuppose a fixed, invariable type. This type, however, cannot be furnished by 
experience, for it is experience that also presents these so-called monstrosities, deformities, 
intermediate products, etc. The fixed type rather presupposes the self-subsistence and dignity 
of the determination stemming from the Concept. (EN par 250) 
This "impotence" of nature is also its strength, for nature's overall role within the development of 
spirit is precisely to show forth externality, separation, and to provide the necessary framework 
and background on which spirit can erect culture and history. 
Insides 
Nonetheless, the transition from nature to spirit is not a Cartesian jump from a purely external 
nature to a purely internal soul. The unity of an animal organism is already internalized in the 
sensations of the animal, especially in higher animals who feel their own individuality and assert 
their own individual habits. Even magnetic and chemical phenomena show that natural beings 
have internal connections. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6
 In the third edition of the EN this is par. 368	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There is no sudden leap from the final paragraphs about nature in the Encyclopedia to the first 
paragraphs about spirit. Hegel starts his treatment of human spirit with animal feelings and 
environmental influences, and only gradually builds up to self-conscious thought. 
On the social level, human culture develops by internalizing its earlier historical phases. 
Different partial moments of what will become a fully developed rational society have their time 
in the sun and then become subsidiary moments in more complex social formations. As opposed 
to nature, where the different moments are scattered about spatially and continue to exist on their 
own, in European history different moments succeed one another temporally. They appear as 
societies dominated by principles of unity and institutions based on partial aspects of the 
Concept: autocracy, slavery, feudalism, democracy, and so on. They eventually change due to 
their internal contradictions, and their principles of unity are retained as self-consciously 
secondary moments in new and more complex unities. So the struggle to the death that Hegel 
takes to be the initial form of the search for mutual recognition persists in modern society as the 
discipline in educational systems. Absolute monarchical forms persist in a constitutional limited 
monarchy. Older forms have their one-sidedness and claims of totality cancelled as they take 
their places in a more adequate unity. The past is taken up anew. Spirit's ability to look back 
upon this history of its becoming completes its present-day self-understanding, and this 
presentation of itself to itself is a key to its complete development. 
Nature does not perform such self-aware retrospection. In this sense, too, nature has no history. 
Recall that for Hegel, tribes and peoples do not "have a history" until they begin to reflect on 
themselves as a people and record unified narratives of their own development. A chronicle of 
events is not yet a history. Hegel sees primitive tribes and nomads as having developed through a 
sequence of events, but not as having a self-aware history. 
In external nature, the more complex builds on the simpler, so more primitive kinds of natural 
unities do get taken up into more complex systems. But the simpler also remains independent. As 
we ascend the scale of nature toward the animal organism, we see simpler levels of nature 
incorporated, for instance when hydraulic and chemical processes are domesticated into the 
higher purposes of an organism. However there remain other free hydraulic and chemical 
processes occurring spatially scattered about on their own. Nature never comes together, neither 
spatially nor temporally. So although Hegel is no dualist, it is tempting to tie nature to outside 
and space, and culture to inside and time. 
Inside Out, Nature's Time 
However, Hegel's external/internal division is not as sharp as it might seem. There is spatial 
externality in culture, and there is a kind of external history in nature. 
In his account of world history Hegel sees different cultural units remaining spatially exterior to 
one another. The Chinese, the Indians, the Africans are seen by Hegel as having become frozen 
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at earlier stages of spiritual development. He never really explains why these cultures failed to 
progress, except by making Eurocentric judgments about the capabilities of other peoples. Nor 
does he explain how these scattered cultural "species" deal with one another, except to imply that 
the expansion of European capitalism and colonialism may transform the older cultures as they 
are dragged into the worldwide market and civil society. In any case, the relations between 
different cultural units show a spatial externality of different moments of spirit's development 
scattered around the globe, similar to the mutual externality of natural phenomena. 
On the other hand, nature includes its own modes of internalization and its own kind of 
temporality. When Hegel was writing in the 1820s, it was becoming evident that the earth had 
developed over a long time, with huge variations in its organic populations and geological forms. 
Looking at the developments in the new science of geology, Hegel asserted they showed a very 
long period, "and in the matter of years one can be generous" (EN par. 339z), during which the 
current geological face of the earth had been shaped by slow processes whose sequence can be 
read in the current formations.  
If the strata written in rocks and hills show a temporal dimension, what about the fossils found in 
those rocks? Though Hegel rejected the theories of evolution current in his day, he did leave 
room for historical unfolding of the Concept. True, his overriding interest is in natural 
phenomena as examples for a table of necessary types and features. But given the empirical 
evidence he was willing to consider the possibility that different systems and levels of 
complexity may have appeared in history at different times.  
Hegel knew contemporary theories of evolution. Unlike Darwin's they employed teleological 
descriptions of nature as moving from indefinite beginnings to highly differentiated organisms, 
culminating in humans. Although Hegel did not accept these theories, he admitted that it was 
possible that animal species emerged sequentially. His doctrine of the role of contingency in 
nature allows for flexibility in the handling of natural history. Hegel did not think that 
contemporary biology proved (or disproved) evolution. He regarded the origin of species as an 
empirical question that did not impact the crucial investigation of just what logical categories 
were necessary to comprehend nature. He said that even if organisms did evolve through a series 
of stages, that fact was not of philosophical interest. How things developed is a contingent 
matter; he was interested in what they are, and the necessary conceptual moments of the Idea.  
The concept tirelessly and in a universal manner posits all particularity in existence. It is a 
completely empty thought to represent species as developing successively, one after another, 
in time. Chronological difference has no interest whatever for thought. If it is only a question 
of enumerating the series of living species in order to show the mind how they are divided 
into classes, either by starting from the poorest and simplest terms, and rising to the more 
developed and richer in determinations and content, or by proceeding in the reverse fashion, 
this operation will always have a general interest. It will be a way of arranging things as in 
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the division of nature into three kingdoms; this is preferable to jumbling them together . . . .  
But it must not be imagined that such a dry series is made dynamic or philosophical, or more 
intelligible, or whatever you like to say, by representing the terms as producing each other. 
(EN par. 249z)7 
Hegel knew that the earth had once supported quite different types of animals. His dominant 
interpretation of this was that nature in its impotence and inability to adhere to categorically 
necessary divisions had produced monsters and unsuccessful mixed forms, some of which have 
failed and some of which exist even now as do the platypus and marine mammals. 
But there is more to be said, for nature does recapitulate itself, externally. One way is in the 
animal organism. But we can see that recapitulation clearly in the rocks. There we see an 
external internalization: geological formations are made out of older formations, and current 
formations show that sequence. Consider the strata revealed on a hillside. Hegel admits that it 
has taken eons for the geological formations to achieve that present form. He admits that their 
chronology can be read from the formations. And since Hegel claims that the different kinds of 
rocks and different geological formations express different necessary moments of the Concept, 
contemporary geological features sum up the necessary moments.  
In the study of geology then, we must first direct our attention to the general mass of rocks 
and the Concept of the moments, rather than thoughtlessly enumerate the different kinds, 
straightway converting a small difference into a fresh genus or species. What is most 
important is to follow the transitions from one layer to another. Nature keeps to this order 
only in a general way and numerous variations occur, although the basic features of the order 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Theories of evolution in Hegel’s day conceived of a goal-directed movement from 
undifferentiated to differentiated organisms.  Hegel rejected this, though his logic agreed that 
beginnings in any sphere were relatively undifferentiated. His point against evolution was that 
the concepts of the fuller, more differentiated natural systems could be developed on their own in 
the Logic; they were not just variations of more primitive systems. The paragraph cited in the 
text continues: “Animal nature is the truth [the completion or richer reality summing up a 
process or development] of vegetable nature, vegetable of mineral; the earth is the truth of the 
solar system. In a system, it is the most abstract term that is the first, and the truth of each sphere 
is the last; but this again is only the first of a higher sphere. It is the necessity of the Idea that 
causes each sphere to complete itself by passing into another higher one, and the variety of forms 
must be considered as necessary and determinate. The land animal did not develop naturally out 
of the aquatic animal, nor did it fly into the air on leaving the water, nor did perhaps the bird 
again fall back to earth. If we want to compare the different stages of nature, it is quite proper to 
note that, for example, a certain animal has one ventricle and another has two; but we must not 
then talk of the fact as if we were dealing with parts which had been put together. Still less must 
the category of earlier spheres be used to explain others: for this is a formal error, as when it is 
said that the plant is a carbon pole and the animal a nitrogen pole” (EN par 249z).   	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persist. Heim, with a truly philosophical view of the matter, has very clearly exhibited this 
transition, the breaking forth of one rock in another. (E 340z) 8  
These different geological moments do not interact as do the necessary subsystems of an 
organism. Older formations are simply adjacent to one another, or have been deformed to lie on 
top of one another, or new formations been made out of fragments of the older. They incorporate 
one another, rest upon and support one another, get folded into mountains, and show the 
transition from one rock type to another.  
The hillside thus presents an external summation and history. The various moments and 
necessary kinds of rocks are scattered about in contingent ways but together the contemporary 
landscape reveals all the essential types. The mountain is not aware of the way it is composed of 
fragments of previous geological formations or of the way in which the different geological 
strata and formations express different moments in the processes of spirit. But that unity and 
those processes are there, externally united and recapitulated, open to be read and already formed 
into a historical "text." 
There is no historian for this external text but there is a sequence; nature recapitulates its own 
temporality in an exterior history shown by coexistence and reuse in geology and by organic 
unity in the plant and animal kingdoms. This is not a history as written by a self-consciousness, 
but it bears some analogy to the non-history of those tribes and peoples who went from one event 
to another without proper recollections or self-awareness. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8
 Hegel's desire to see all the moments of the Concept revealed and summed up in contemporary 
geological formations means that he attributed more unity to those formations then we would do. 
Hegel also thought that whatever the empirical processes may have been, they are finished, now 
that they have produced an essentially complete repertory of species and geological forms. 
"There were events which shaped the present earth, but that becoming of the earth occurred in a 
kind of absolute past, something over and done with, which has now produced the repertory of 
rock types that reveal the moments of the Idea. Formerly, history applied to the earth, but now it 
has come to a halt: a life which, inwardly fermenting, had time within its own self; the earth-
spirit which has not yet reached the stage of opposition—the movement and dreaming of one 
asleep, until it awakes and receives its consciousness in man, and so confronts itself as a 
stabilised formation" (EN 339z). We might connect this with the much discussed "end of 
history" in Hegel. Hegel does seem to think that whatever the defects of actual European 
societies of his day, the general principles of a fully rational and free society have now been 
developed. History has ended, in the sense that all the dimensions of social life have been 
revealed. This does not mean that events will not continue, as nations rise and fall. But the stage 
is fully set; no new principles are needed. Similarly, nature has revealed all its essential 
moments. What matters to Hegel are those moments; whether or not they developed in history is 
not as crucial to nature as it is to culture. So he can accept or reject evolution depending on the 
empirical evidence. But even if he accepted evolution he would not see the present as just one 
contingent stage in an ongoing process of change. See Kolb 2008 for a discussion of this point, 
and its connection to Hegel's curious silence about uniformitarianism in geology.	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In concluding we should note that Hegel's treatment of nature's forms and levels does not yet 
enter into what has become an enormous discussion from Darwin and Nietzsche onward about 
how natural and social forms might emerge contingently without either teleological guidance or 
conceptual necessity. For these thinkers, externality invades the spiritual sphere. Hegel’s play of 
externality and internalization continues but the ways in which later natural and cultural 
formations incorporate and reuse earlier forms resembles more the loose unities of external 
geological accumulations than the tight conceptual unities that Hegel sought.  
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